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Abstract
It is recalled that the only non-nuclear military application in which
depleted-uranium alloys out-perform present-day tungsten alloys is long-rod
penetration into a main battle-tank’s armor. However, this advantage is only
on the order of 10%, and it disappears when the uranium versus tungsten
comparison is made in terms of actual lethality of complete anti-tank systems
instead of laboratory-type homogeneous armor steel penetration capability.
Therefore, new micro- and nano-engineered tungsten alloys may soon
be at least as good if not better than uranium alloys, enabling the production
of tungsten munition which will be better than existing uranium munition,
and whose overall life-cycle cost will be lower, due to the absence of the
problems related to the radioactivity of uranium.
The reasons why depleted-uranium weapons have been introduced into
arsenals and used in Iraq and Yugoslavia are analysed from the perspective
that their radioactivity must have played an important role in the decision
making process. It is found that depleted-uranium weapons belong to the dif-
fuse category of low-radiological-impact nuclear weapons to which emerging
types of low-yield (i.e., fourth generation) nuclear explosives also belong.
It is concluded that the battlefield use of depleted-uranium in the 1991
Gulf War, which broke a 46-year-long taboo against the intentional use
or induction of radioactivity in combat, has created a military and legal
precedent which has trivialized the combat use of radioactive materials, and
therefore made the use of nuclear weapons more probable.
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1 Introduction
When conventional weapons containing depleted-uranium were used for the first
time in combat during the 1991 Gulf War, there was immediate reaction from the
general public, environmental groups, and anti-nuclear activists. This reaction has
now turned into a major environmental, medical, technical, legal, and political op-
position with many thousands “anti-depleted-uranium activists” in many countries
striving to outlaw the use of depleted-uranium in weapons and consumer goods.
What drove this reaction was common sense. Indeed, while there had been
little public or parliamentary opposition to the development and deployment of
conventional weapons containing depleted-uranium before the Gulf War, the im-
mediate consequence of their actual use in Iraq was the realization that uranium
(whether natural, enriched, or depleted) is not a trivial material that can be placed
in the same category as tungsten or steel. In fact, it was this same commonsense
understanding of the deep political significance of the military use of a radioactive
material that drove the only parliamentary reaction, by Senator Bob Dole, to the
1978 decision by the U.S. Department of Defense to use depleted-uranium for
making bullets [1].
Of course, an important reason for the lack of significant early opposition to
the military use of depleted-uranium is that its radiological impact is very much
lower than that of existing types of nuclear weapons: atomic and hydrogen bombs.
As is well known, depleted-uranium is only about half as radioactive as natural
uranium, which is a low radioactive material. But being radioactive means that
any uranium-based material is qualitatively different from any non-radioactive
material, and therefore means that any use of uranium has important medical,
technical, legal, and political implications. Moreover, there is no doubt that these
differences have always been perfectly understood in professional circles, as is
witnessed by the considerable amount of legislation dealing with all types of
radioactive materials, and the special efforts that had to be made, for example
in the United States, to release depleted-uranium for commercial use [2], and to
enable it to be incorporated in “conventional” weapons and possibly exported to
foreign countries [3].
The only context in which the use of depleted-uranium could have been “be-
nign” is that of a nuclear war. This is why many people perceived armor-piercing
munitions containing depleted-uranium as a tolerable part of a strategy to deter a
massive tank attack by the nuclear-armed Warsaw Pact Organization. But Iraq in
1991 did not have nuclear weapons. This made the first use of depleted-uranium
weapons during the 1991 Gulf War, which broke a 46-year-long taboo against the
intentional use or induction of radioactivity in combat, particularly shocking.
3
It is therefore understandable that there have been a lot of over-reactions. On the
one side many opponents predicted apocalyptic consequences on the environment
and the affected populations, and on the other side many governmental and official
bodies counter-reacted by excessively down-playing the consequences of the use
of depleted-uranium weapons.
There have been many papers, both in newspapers and in professional jour-
nals, discussing the near- and long-term environmental, medical, and radiological
consequencies of depleted-uranium weapons. On the other hand, there have been
surprisingly few published investigations on the whys and wherefores of depleted-
uranium weapons — namely the technical and military reasons why they were first
introduced into arsenals, and the strategic-political reasons why they were then
used against Iraq and former Yugoslavia, two non-nuclear-weapon states.
In particular, it appears that there is no published critical study of the much-
vaunted superiority of uranium-based over tungsten-based anti-tank weapons,
despite the fact that several major countries, most prominently Germany, have
equipped their tank fleets with tungsten-based anti-tank weapons which are claimed
to be good enough to defeat the armor of all existing tanks. In fact, as will be
seen in section 2, this paradox is easily dismissed by looking at the professional
literature, which shows that while penetrators made of tungsten alloys are some-
what inferior to depleted-uranium ones, the overall performance of tungsten-based
anti-tank weapons is not worse than that of their uranium-based counterparts.
Moreover, it appears that there is no published critical study that focuses on the
only fundamental property that distinguishes uranium from its competitors,namely
the fact that it is radioactive, and examines it from the point of view of its strategic
and political consequences.1 In effect, the numerous studies in which radioactivity
is taken into account are only those dealing with the environmental, medical, and
legal consequences of the combat-use of depleted-uranium. The only exception
seems to be a study in which the radiological effect due to the large-scale battlefield
use of depleted-uranium is compared to that of existing and hypothetical fourth
generation nuclear weapons [5]. This study will be reviewed in section 3, and put
into perspective with other elements which suggest the conclusion that possibly
the most powerful institutional force behind the development and deployment
of depleted-uranium weapons must have been the “nuclear lobby,” which in all
nuclear-weapon states is pushing towards the trivialization of the use of nuclear
materials of all kinds, and of nuclear weapons of current or future types.
In this paper, therefore, an attempt will be made to understand the “whys and
1The same remark applies to the pyrophoric property of uranium: there appears to be no
published study discussing the quantitative importance of this effect in tank warfare [4].
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wherefores” of depleted-uranium weapons — the technical and military advan-
tages which could have justified their introduction into arsenals, and the political
and strategic reasons which could explain their actual battlefield use, despite the
environmental, medical, legal, and political drawbacks which were known long
before they were developed and used. In section 4, this attempt will be merged with
what is already better-known about depleted-uranium weapons, and a conclusion
derived to give additional arguments for an immediate ban of depleted-uranium
weapons of all kind.
2 Are uranium alloys really better than tungsten
alloys for conventional weapons?
In a number of civilian and military applications the decisive physical characteristic
of a material is its density. The next decisive parameter is usually cost, which
means that the material should be made of an element that is reasonably abundant
on Earth. If the density has to be as high as possible, the choice must be between
four elements, namely tungsten, uranium, tantalum, and hafnium, which have as
maximum density 19.2, 19.0, 16.7, and 13.3. By comparison, in crystal rocks,
these elements are all about ten times less abundant than lead, density 11.3, which
itself is about thousand times less abundant than iron, density 7.8.
The main technical reason why high-density materials are important in con-
ventional weapons comes from the so-called “Root Density Law,” a very simple
result that can be derived as an exercise by students of a final-year high-school
physics class. It says that when a rod of lengthL, made of some material of density
ρ1, penetrates at very high velocity another material of density ρ2, the maximum
penetration length under ideal conditions is
√
ρ1/ρ2 × L. By “ideal conditions”
it is meant that the two materials interact so fast and violently at their contact
interface that they immediately melt, which is why these conditions are named
“hydrodynamic limit.” However, even below this limit, the Root Density Law
is pertinent for comparing processes where kinetic energy is exchanged between
materials of different densities.
For example, in the case of a tungsten or uranium anti-tank penetrator of
length L, the absolute maximum penetration depth into homogeneous steel is√
19/7.8×L ≈ 1.5×L. This means that the penetration power into homogeneous
steel armor is at most 50% higher for a tungsten or uranium rod than for a steel
rod. Therefore, in all applications where the Root Density Law applies, and where
steel is replaced by a higher-density material, the potential benefit is at most 50%.
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Moreover, if instead of comparing the differences between the use of a high-
density versus a low-density material, one compares the differences between the
use of one high-density material with that of another high-density material (i.e.,
an uranium alloy versus a tungsten alloy), the differences to be expected from the
unavoidable disparities in the respective mechanical properties of the two alloys
will necessarily be smaller than 50% in any application where the conditions of
use are close to the “hydrodynamic limit.” In other words, when one is discussing
the merits and demerits of using an uranium instead of a tungsten alloy, one is in
fact discussing small differencies, on the order of 10–20%, not large differences
which could turn an uranium-based weapon into a “superweapon” compared to
the same weapon made out of tungsten!
Therefore, the whole discussion in this section turns around the impact of
relatively small mechanical and metallurgical differencies between various alloys
based on either uranium or tungsten. Indeed, if these two elements had the same
physical and chemical properties, and would therefore form similar alloys when
combined with other elements, the obvious choice would be tungsten — and in
most cases uranium would immediately be discarded because of its radioactivity.
The problem is that in the conditions where the disparities in mechanical properties
of different alloys have a visible impact, i.e. below the hydrodynamic limit, there
are many concurrent processes in which each of these disparities has a different
effect: if one property is favorable in some process, it will not necessarily be so
in another one. Therefore, there is no alloy, based on either uranium or tungsten,
which has at the same time all the desirable properties. The result is that the choice
of a given alloy is a compromise, and this is reflected in the fifty years long history
during which either tungsten or uranium alloys have been considered as the “best”
for one weapon’s use or another. (For the history of their use in anti-tank weapons,
see [6, 7, 8, 9]. For a number of general and technical references on tank warfare
see [10, 11, 12].)
To understand where we stand today, we have to review the major conventional
weapons applications in which high-density materials are used:
• Penetration aids for bombs or cruise missiles;
• Shield plates for armored tanks;
• Munitions for anti-tank weapons;
• Munitions for ground-attack aircrafts or close-in-defense guns.
These four sets of applications are discussed in the next sub-sections, which
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are organized in a logical sequence — the information given in each one is useful
to understand the next sub-sections.
2.1 Penetration aids for bombs or cruise missiles
In these applications, the high-density material is used to give more weight and a
slimmer profile to the weapon, for example a free-fall or rocket-assisted bomb, so
that it will have more kinetic energy per unit frontal area when hitting the target (an
airport runway, a bunker, etc.). This enables the warhead to penetrate deeper into
the target before the explosive is detonated by a delayed fuse, which enormously
increases the damage. Obviously, in such applications it is mandatory that the nose
of the penetrator, as well as the casing enclosing the warhead, remain functional
as long as possible. Their strength and hardness therefore need to be as high as
possible. From all that is known about the respective mechanical properties of
uranium and tungsten alloys, the first choice is then clearly tungsten.2
In the case of long-range cruise missiles, the same reasoning applies, with
the difference that weight considerations have a different impact on the design.
This is because a cruise missile is both a delivery system and a bomb. If too
much weight is given to the warhead, the range of the cruise missile will be
considerably shortened. Moreover, there is a an obvious trade-off between the
amount of high-explosives that is carried and the weight of the penetration aid.
Either the conventional warhead is made as powerful as possible (or eventually
replaced by a nuclear explosive) and the weapon is detonated on the surface or at a
shallow depth into the target, or else some quantity of high-explosive is sacrificed
to increase the weight of the penetrator in order to gain a factor which may be
as large as ten in the case of a deep penetration. The trouble is that the impact
velocity of a cruise-missile is not as large as that of a bomb. The impact conditions
are even likely to be well below the “hydrodynamic limit,” so that little benefit is to
be expected from the Root Density Law. A hardened steel or titanium penetrator
could therefore be just as good as a heavy-metal penetrator, and the possibility that
the cruise missiles used in the Gulf War or in Yugoslavia carried a heavy-metal
penetrator is only a speculation since “there is no publicly available information
at all that supports such an assumption” [13, p.165].
In summary, the best material currently available for the nose or casing of a
hard-target penetrating warhead is tungsten heavy-alloy. However, if the material
is used only as a ballast to increase the total weight of the warhead for better
2Moreover, the potential advantage of uranium over tungsten alloys exists only for penetrating
monoblock metallic-targets, not for penetrating concrete or rocks.
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penetration performance, any heavy-material can be used in principle.
2.2 Shield plates for armored tanks
In the case of this application, it is important to know that the shield of a modern
battle-tank is designed to protect the crew and the main components (engine, gun,
ammunition, fuel-tank) from a large range of threats: conventional and nuclear
bombs, shaped-charges delivered by bazookas or precision-guided munitions, anti-
tank rounds fired by enemy tanks or heavy guns, landmines, etc. For these reasons
the shield of such a tank is a complicated structure comprising several layers of
materials of different densities, interspaced with composite or fibrous materials,
and possibly covered with reactive components such as high-explosive charges
which automatically detonate to interfere with or destroy the darts or penetrators
of anti-tank weapons.
If one focuses on anti-tank rounds fired by enemy tanks or heavy guns, also
called “kinetic energy projectiles,” the decisive element of a tank shield is that the
main structural material, a thick layer of armor steel, is supplemented by one or two
other layers, or arrays of plates, made of some tough material able to deflect, bend,
break, or at least slow down, the anti-tank projectiles so as to prevent them from
fully penetrating the main armor. The effectiveness of this shielding mechanism
has been demonstrated in many tanks built in the past decades. From recent
publications it appears, for example, that a long-rod penetrator emerging from a
1 cm thick steel plate hit at high obliquity has a residual penetration capability of
only about 50% of that of the original rod [14]. This shows that the “obliquity
advantage” of designing armored vehicles with glacis and sloped walls is quite
important, and explains why anti-tank weapons capable of penetrating more than
60 cm of homogeneous armor steel are needed in order to defeat the armor of
modern tanks [6].
Therefore, an array of relative thin steel plates, put at an oblique position in front
of the main armor, has a considerable shielding effect. This effect can be further
enhanced by the use of “sandwiches” in which steel plates are combined with layers
of plastic or ceramic materials, or by replacing the steel with some higher-density
material. This calls for a hard high-strength heavy alloy, with tungsten the first
choice again, even though the U.S. incorporated steel-clad depleted-uranium plates
in the M-1 tanks deployed in Iraq during the Gulf War. However, contrary to the
first two applications in which the “Root Density Law” could bring an improvement
of up to 50%, the incorporation of heavy alloys in armor has only a marginal effect
on the overall performance of the shield, especially if the heavy-material plates
are made thinner than the original steel plates to keep the total weight constant.
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Moreover, the difference between using uranium instead of tungsten will have an
even more marginal effect, because there is no mechanical property of importance
in this application that is very significantly different between alloys of either of
these two materials.
2.3 Penetrators for anti-tank weapons
In this application, the discussion is more complicated because a number of dis-
tinct physical phenomena, which imply conflicting requirements on correlated
mechanical properties, have to be taken into account. For instance, anti-tank pen-
etrators are first accelerated in a gun, where they are submitted to very high stress,
vibrations, etc., until they exit from the gun muzzle where they violently separate
from the “sabot” that was holding them during acceleration; secondly, they travel
through air, where they can break because of bending or buckling; and thirdly they
eventually encounter a tank shield, where everything is done to defeat their action.
These three are, in gunnery jargon, the internal, external, and terminal ballistics
problems — to which one has to add the lethality problem, because piercing an
armor is not enough to inflict damage or loss of function behind the armor. There-
fore, whereas in the applications considered in the two previous sub-sections the
problem naturally led to a single set of requirements to be met by the properties
of the material, and thus to relatively unsophisticated uranium or tungsten alloys,
in the tank armor penetration application no single alloy has simultaneously the
ideal properties suiting the requirements of the three ballistic problems. For this
reason, over the past fifty years, small differences between successive generations
of uranium and tungsten alloys have resulted in either the former or the latter
being perceived as “better or worse” for one ballistic phase or another, or for the
anti-tank ballistic problem as a whole.
To discuss these problems it is best to start from the target and work backwards
to the gun, and then add overall performance and lethality considerations at the
end. Moreover, in the perspective of assessing the possible advantages of the use
of uranium instead of tungsten, we will concentrate on the long-rod penetrators
that are fired by the 120mm guns which today equip most of the main battle-tanks
in service in the major Western powers’s armies. Typically, these penetrators are
heavy-material rods of about 60 cm in length and 2 cm in diameter. Therefore,
according to the Root Density Law, the maximum penetration depth should be
about 60×1.5 = 90 cm in homogeneous armor steel, while the observed maximum
is only about 60 cm for penetrators shot by a tank gun. This is because the impact
velocities of tank-fired projectiles are in the range of 1200 to 1700 m/s, which
corresponds to a transition region somewhat below the hydrodynamic limit that
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is reached only in laboratory experiments where velocities of about 4000 m/s are
achieved [15, Figure 2].
The slow evolution in heavy-metal alloy physics and metallurgy which led to
such a penetration capability is described in a number of papers, for example refer-
ences [7, 8] which emphasize depleted-uranium alloys and the 1950-1980 period,
and reference [6] which emphasizes tungsten alloys and the more recent period.
In this evolution, the yardstick for comparing various alloys has become the depth
of penetration in “Rolled Homogeneous Armor” (RHA) steel, i.e., the best pos-
sible armor steel. This gives a very telling and impressive figure of merit, which
is however only one parameter of importance in the anti-tank ballistic problem.
Nevertheless, without entering into the historical details, whereas tungsten alloys
were in general favored from the late 1950s until the early 1970s, the preference
started to shift in the United States towards uranium alloys in the mid-1970s after
the successful development of a new uranium alloy containing 0.75% per weight
titanium [7]. This alloy overcame several technical and manufacturing problems
that previously gave the preference to tungsten. Moreover, the penetration capa-
bility of this U-3/4Ti alloy in RHA steel was consistently better than any tungsten
alloy of equal density. This improvement was the more impressive that the U-
3/4Ti holes into RHA steel were both deeper and narrower than those produced
by tungsten alloys, all other things been equal.
At the beginning, of course, the exact numbers showing how much the new
uranium alloy was better than the tungsten alloys available at the time were clas-
sified (see, e.g., [8]). But since at least 1990 numerous unclassified professional
publications are given them, e.g., [16, 17, 18]. There are also numerous publi-
cations in which the overall average advantage of uranium alloys over tungsten
alloys is given as a single number. For example, S.P. Andrews et al., working on
contract for the U.S. Army, claim that “the ballistic performance of DU alloys and
tungsten alloys against monolithic semi-infinite steel targets is similar — at best
5 to 10% difference” [19, p.255]. Similarly, R.J. Dowding of the U.S. Army Re-
search Laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, states that “depleted-uranium
alloys outperform tungsten alloys by 10% at ordnance velocities” [20, p.4].
Looking at the data, one finds as expected that the penetration advantage of
uranium over tungsten alloys is less pronounced for high velocity projectiles be-
cause the conditions are closer to the hydrodynamic limit. For instance, comparing
the penetration efficiencies at 1200 and 1700 m/s impact velocities, the advantages
are 25 and respectively 5% in reference [16, Fig.3], 20 and 15% in reference [17,
p.43], and finally 25 and 15% in reference [18, Fig.2]. But these numbers should
be taken with caution. While they clearly demonstrate an advantage of about 10
to 20% over the velocity range of interest for anti-tank weapons, they derive from
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drawings that are quite poor according to normal scientific standards: there are
no error bars and the figures are clearly drawn to impress the non-specialists (see,
especially, reference [17]). Therefore, since these data constitute the main (if not
only) objective element that supports the thesis that uranium alloys are more ef-
fective than tungsten alloys for anti-tank weapons, it is important to stress that this
relatively small effect is at the origin of much of the depleted-uranium controversy,
because most of the depleted-uranium expended in Iraq was precisely in the form
of anti-tank penetrators [21].
A second interesting feature shown by the data, e.g., reference [16], is that
the penetration dynamics of uranium rods is different from that of tungsten rods
with the same dimensions and weight. Normally, when a rod of some material
penetrates at high velocity into a target material, a mushroomed region forms near
the impacting end, and its nose erodes (as the penetrator burrows into the target)
by giving up material that is “back-extruded” from the penetrator-target interface
while the interface moves forward into the target. This process is explained and
illustrated in many papers, e.g., [22], as well as in computer animations available
on internet [23]. The interesting feature, which was first observed with the U-3/4Ti
uranium alloy penetration data, is that while all available tungsten alloys retained
a mushroomed head during the full penetration process, the U-3/4Ti uranium alloy
penetrators formed a chiseled nose which resulted in the boring of a narrower
channel which led to deeper penetration than tungsten [16]. Unfortunately this
factual observation led to many simplified and exaggerated statements, which can
even be found in the professional literature, that somehow tungsten penetrators
have necessarily a “large mushroomed head,” while only uranium penetrators
would have a “self-sharpening nose.”
In reality, the 10 to 20% penetration advantage discovered around 1975 with
uranium alloys is due to a small effect that was apparently not properly understood
until 1990, when Lee S. Magness and Thimoty G. Farrand published the correct
explanation [16]. According to them, the reason why U-3/4Ti uranium alloy
penetrators keep a narrow profile during penetration is a metallurgical effect called
“adiabatic shear banding” which implies that failures develop in the highly stressed
nose region in such a way that the edges of the mushroomed head are quickly
discarded, producing a sharpened or chiseled nose [16, 27]. This shearing effect
is small, as can be seen in shallow penetration simulations (e.g, [22, 23]), yet it is
sufficient to produce the 10 to 20% effect in deep penetrations which, according
to numerous accounts, is claimed to be the main reason for deciding to produce
large numbers of uranium penetrators since the late 1970s.
Soon after the origin of this technical advantage of uranium alloys was un-
derstood, and therefore shown not be due to any fundamental difference between
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uranium and other heavy materials, a considerable impetus was given to many
research programs that were trying to find better alloys of tungsten and other ma-
terials (i.e., tantalum and hafnium) to replace and possibly outperform uranium
alloys. The realization that “adiabatic shear behavior (...) aids the performance by
minimizing the size of a mushroomed head on the eroding penetrator” [16, p.473],
along with “concerns over environmental problems” [19, p.249] and depleted-
uranium’s “drawbacks: health safety, cost of clean-up, environmental impact,
political” [20, p.4,12], all led to world-wide efforts to find substitute materials
for uranium-based anti-tank weapons-alternatives that would be “without the per-
ceived hazards and political difficulties associated with DU” [27, p.1188]. To this
effort anti-nuclear activists have substantially contributed by raising the public and
parliamentary awareness of the problems associated with depleted-uranium.
For example, soon after the Gulf War, an ambitious program was initiated
in South Korea, where the proximity of China (the world’s largest producer of
tungsten), the proximity of large potential markets such as Japan, and the un-
certainties of its relations with North Korea, led to more than 13 patents and 23
scientific papers in less than ten years [24, 25, 26]. In this, and other research
programs, e.g., [20, 27, 28], the emphasis is on finding a tungsten or tantalum
alloy, or an amorphous material based for example on hafnium, or even a more
complex nanocrystalline material produced by nanotechnology [27], that would
exhibit adiabatic shear behavior and have the other required properties to be used
for anti-tank penetrators. Apparently, these programs are getting close to achiev-
ing their objectives [20, 27, 26], and it remains to be seen whether these technical
advances will translate into environmentally more acceptable anti-tank weapons.
However, while these technical developments are clearly important to improve
one aspect of the terminal ballistic problem, one should not forget that they will
potentially yield only a small contribution to the overall performance of an anti-
tank system. Moreover, there is an even more important consideration: does
the perceived advantage of adiabatic shearing, namely a deeper but narrower
penetration tunnel, really translate into a higher tank lethality? The answer is
almost certainly no! The reason is that the motivation for seeking deeper but
narrower penetration tunnels is the use of a single figure of merit, the penetration
depth into semi-infinite RHA steel (penetration criterion), which does not take into
consideration that the purpose of piercing armor is to inflict damage behind the
armor: the penetration depth merely says that armor of such a thickness will just
be perforated, with little energy left to inflict damage or loss of function behind
the armor.
Therefore, a more realistic figure of merit is to take, for example, the complete
perforation of a finite thickness of RHA steel plate (perforation criterion). In ef-
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fect, in that case some energy is left after perforation to inflict some damage behind
the armor [18, p.1160]. Using this simple change in the figure of merit, it was
found that whereas using the traditional penetration criterion uranium penetrators
outperform tungsten penetrators by about 15 to 25%, see [18, Fig.2], using the per-
foration criterion there is no longer any significative difference between uranium
and tungsten penetrators, see [18, Fig.3]. The explanation of this important result
is easily found, and related to the fact that tungsten penetrator tunnels are wider
than uranium penetrator tunnels: “uranium penetrates RHA much more effectively
than tungsten; however, tungsten will produce a larger breakout effect. Therefore,
the two processes may cancel each other out, depending on the predominant fail-
ure mechanism of the target evaluated” [18, p.1163]. This result, obtained after a
detailed discussion of the complicated problem of objectively defining the protec-
tion level (or seen from the other perspective the kill probability) of an armored
vehicle, shows that serious methodological issues are still to be resolved by the
designers of armored vehicles and anti-armor weapons!
Indeed, if the United States and a few other countries have proclaimed in the
past 25 years that uranium-based anti-tanks were far better than other ones, several
major countries, most prominently Germany,3 have not equipped their tank fleets
with these, but instead have continuously improved the mechanical properties
and the metallurgy of the tungsten alloy used in their anti-tank penetrators [6].
And it turns out from what is known that these weapons are good enough to
defeat the armor of any existing tank. How is that possible? A realistic criterion
for objectively assessing the capabilities of these weapons is obviously the first
step. But there are other, more direct technical reasons. For instance, some crucial
mechanical properties which are important during the acceleration of the penetrator
in a gun are significantly worse for uranium than for tungsten penetrators. “DU
penetrators therefore need stiffer and heavier sabots than tungsten rods, which
compensates the slightly better impact behavior of DU in RHA” [6, p.1194]. In
a simpler language: what is gained by uranium alloys in the armor penetration
phase, is lost in the initial launch phase and during the flight to the target. But this
does not close the discussion: many more effects should be considered, especially
in the interaction with complex multilayer tank shields [19, p.255], and even more
so in the assessment of the lethality behind the armor [18]. However, as we
have repeatedly stated, each of these effects has a small impact on the overall
performance, so that whatever difference could exist between the properties of one
or another heavy-alloy of tungsten or uranium, they are much more likely to cancel
each other out than to cumulate and give a small advantage to either of them.
This is also true for one property that we have not yet considered, pyrophorism:
3But also Israel, China, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Spain, etc.
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Finely pulverized uranium spontaneously ignites in air. This dramatic effect
certainly adds a lethality component to uranium which tungsten, for example,
does not have. However, when a tank penetrator emerges behind an armor, it
generates an intense shower of melted metallic fragments and particles which
can badly burn the personnel, ignite the fuel-tank, or detonate the munition in
the ammunition store. This is true whatever material the penetrator is made of,
and it it likely that these break-out effects are more important for tungsten than
for uranium penetrators. Moreover, a modern main battle-tank may be equipped
with a controlled atmosphere to protect against chemical weapons and avoid the
propagation of fires: there could be little oxygen for uranium to burn! Nevertheless,
the pyrophoric nature of uranium adds a degree of lethality, which may increase
the level of overkill of a weakly shielded armored vehicle defeated at short range,
but not such a degree that it could significantly increase the kill radius of anti-tank
rounds intended to defeat the best shielded main battle-tanks.
2.4 Munitions for ground-attack aircrafts or close-in-defense
guns
In this last set of applications, the previous considerations about tank shields and
kinetic-energy anti-tank weapons mean that the discussion can be quite short.
Ground-attack aircraft, such as the A-10 of the United States Air Force, have
been designed and deployed “to counter massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored
formations spearheading an attack into NATO’s Central Region (by firing armor
piercing incendiary rounds) designed to blast through top armor of even the heav-
iest enemy tanks” [7]. There are thus two elements to assess: the armor-piercing
and the incendiary capabilities ot the munition. First, as is now amply demon-
strated, the penetration superiority of uranium penetrators corresponds to only a
(small) effect in the case of long-rod penetrators plunging into thick armor: this is
not the case for ground-attack projectiles which are much less slender than long-
rod penetrators, and which are intended to defeat the relatively thin top-armor of
battle-tanks and the walls of relatively lightly armored vehicles such as personnel
carriers. Tungsten projectiles would be just as good. As for the incendiary effect
of A-10 projectiles due to the pyrophoric properties of uranium, it has not been
possible to find any professional-level paper in which it is compared to the incen-
diary effect of tungsten shells containing an incendiary substance. Nevertheless,
since the pyrophoric property of uranium is not such that most of it will burn on
impact, it can be inferred that a tungsten shell containing a sufficient amount of a
truly effective incendiary substance could be just as devastating [29].
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Finally, it remains to discuss the use of heavy materials in munitions for close-in
weapon systems, such as the U.S. Navy “Phalanx” designed to provide a last-ditch
defense against sea-skimming missiles [7]. In this application the main reason
for using heavy metals is that a smaller and slimmer bullet has a significantly
better external ballistics trajectory, which increases the precision of the system.
On the other hand, since sea-skimming missiles (or for that matter most types of
precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles) are relatively “soft” targets, the
armor penetration capabilities of heavy-metal alloys are of secondary importance.
The interesting aspect in the history of this application is that after deciding in 1978
to use a uranium alloy, the U.S. Navy decided in 1989 to change to tungsten alloys,
“based on live fire tests showing that tungsten met their performance requirements
while offering reduced probabilities of radiation exposure and environmental im-
pact” [7]. After this change from uranium to tungsten, further developments were
made on the projectile, and a new tungsten alloy led to “improved ballistic per-
formance by 50% compared to existing tungsten alloy penetrators” [30]. While
nothing is said about the reasons for this improvement, it most probably comes
from the superior internal ballistics behavior of tungsten projectiles, which allows
a tungsten bullet to be launched at a higher velocity than a uranium bullet.
3 Are depleted-uranium weapons conventional or
nuclear weapons?
A central element in the depleted-uranium controversy is that on the one hand it is
both radioactive and usable in civilian and military applications of nuclear energy,
and that on the other hand the proponents of its “non-nuclear” uses claim that it
can be treated as interchangeable with a heavy material such as tungsten. This
leads to questions ranging from “Is depleted-uranium a nuclear or conventional
material?” to “Are depleted-uranium weapons conventional or nuclear weapons?’
as well as to more fundamental questions such as “What is a nuclear material?” or
“What is a nuclear weapon?” (And to their converse where the adjective nuclear
is replaced by conventional, because “conventional” may not necessarily mean the
same as “non-nuclear”.)
These are perfectly reasonable questions, but they are very difficult to answer
without taking many technical, legal, political, and even historical considerations
into account. A comprehensive analysis is not possible in a single paper, and
certainly not in a paper written by a single author. Nevertheless, it is possible to give
a reasonable first answer to the question “What is a nuclear material or weapon?”
and thus to develop useful pointers to answering the other questions. Moreover,
15
in relation to depleted-uranium weapons, it is possible to present some important
elements, which have not been much discussed in the published literature, showing
that their combat use cannot be separated from the potential use of nuclear weapons
[5]. This is what will be done in the next three subsections.
3.1 Nuclear and conventional materials
Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which came into force in July 1957, defines a nuclear material as being either a
source material or a special fissionable material. In simplified language, which
hides many technical and legal subtleties, a special fissionable material (e.g.,
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233, plutonium, etc.) is any fissionable
material that has been artificially transformed or produced to make it more suitable
for use in a nuclear reactor or a fission explosive; and a source material (e.g.,
natural uranium, uranium depleted in the isotope 235, thorium, etc.) is any
material suitable for transformation into a special nuclear material (by enrichment,
transmutation, etc.). Therefore, the term nuclear material covers all materials
which may be used, either directly or after transformation, in a nuclear reactor or
in the core of a fission explosive, i.e., an “atomic bomb,” in which a self-sustaining
chain reaction takes place. Consequently, the term non-nuclear material covers
all other materials, even though they include light elements such as tritium and
lithium which are the main source of the explosive power of a fusion explosive,
i.e., a “hydrogen bomb.” On the other hand, article XX makes no qualitative
distinction between natural-uranium and depleted-uranium, which are therefore
both nuclear materials.
In practice, such definitions, which have the merit of being clear and consis-
tent with both physical facts and common sense, were bound to create difficulties
because of the dual-use characteristics, i.e., military and civilian, of nuclear mate-
rials. Therefore, as soon as the IAEA tried to implement its role in the safeguard of
nuclear materials, it had to introduce a quantitative element in order to establish a
complicated accounting system for tracing the flow of nuclear materials throughout
the world: “effective weights” were assigned to nuclear materials on a subjective
scale where, for example, 1 ton of depleted-uranium would be equivalent to only 50
grams of special fissionable material [31], even though 1 ton of depleted-uranium
could contain several kilograms of uranium 235. On the other end of the spectrum,
to deal with problems related to plutonium and highly enriched uranium, further
definitions had to be introduced, e.g., the term nuclear-weapon-usable material
to designate nuclear materials that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear
explosive components without transmutation or further enrichment.
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The result was the beginning of a process which facilitated the non-military uses
and the international trade of nuclear materials, while at the same time stretching
out the scale used to classify these materials. Consequently, the materials sitting
at either ends of the scale started to become exceptions of one type or another. On
the one end, nuclear-weapon-usable materials became more and more inaccessible
to the non-nuclear-weapon states, with nuclear-weapon states exerting more and
more direct pressure on those states, e.g., Yugoslavia, which had some amount
of nuclear-weapon-usable materials on their territory [32]. On the other end, the
same nuclear-weapon states made a lot of efforts to trivialize the use of the main
by-product of the nuclear industry: depleted-uranium. This can clearly be seen
in United States legislation [2, 3], but also in international agreements such as
the London Guidelines, which make exceptions for “source material which the
Government is satisfied is to be used only in non-nuclear activities, such as the
production of alloys or ceramics” [33, Annex A]. In this guideline, “Government”
refers to the exporting country, which means that such a government is authorized
to allow the export of depleted-uranium for the purpose of making, for example,
tank penetrators.
This “stretching out” process, which reflects the growing tension between
nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, or would-be-nuclear-wea-
pon states, is also visible in the evolution of concepts such as “peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities” and “proliferation-prone nuclear activities.” While nuclear-weapon states
insist on the peaceful and benign character of their broad and extensive nuclear
activities, they impose very narrow and restrictive definitions of these activities
by others. This was particularly visible in 1991 when the IAEA was requested by
the Security Council to carry out immediate on-site inspection in Iraq: for the first
time, all activities prone to nuclear weapons proliferation had to be explicitly and
comprehensively defined in an annex to a Security Council resolution so that the
inspection team had a clear mandate to work from [34, Appendix]. This annex
confirmed IAEA’s definitions of nuclear materials, but introduced other definitions
and restrictions, such as the prohibition of the production of “isotopes of pluto-
nium, hydrogen, lithium, boron and uranium,” which placed in the same category
materials that are of importance to both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons [34,
p.11].
To conclude this subsection, it can be asserted that the concept of nuclear
material as defined by the Statute of the IAEA is still valid today. Therefore,
depleted-uranium is definitely a nuclear material according to international law,
even though there is a trend to trivialize its use in so-called “non-nuclear appli-
cations.” This trivialization is clearly in contradiction with the legal status of the
material, as well as with jurisprudence, because it is impossible to prove that a
nuclear material is used “only in non-nuclear activities” [33] or “solely to take
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advantage of (its) high density or pyrophoric characteristics” [3]. In fact, such
“declarations of intent” are used as the main argument in the laborious argumenta-
tions put forward by those who argue that depleted-uranium weapons are neither
radiological or nuclear weapons see, e.g., [35].4
3.2 Nuclear and conventional weapons
The words of most international arms-control agreements, such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
do not include definitions of essential terms, such as “nuclear weapon” or “nuclear
explosion,” even though these terms refer to what is controlled or prohibited by
the treaties. The reason is the difficulty of defining them in unambiguous technical
language that would be acceptable to all parties. The definition and interpretation
of these terms are therefore left to each individual party, which may share its
interpretations confidentially with other parties, and possibly make them public in
a declaration.
Consequently, in order to learn about what is really understood by the terms
“nuclear weapon” and “nuclear explosion” one must analyse the declarations made
by many countries, the statements they made during the negotiations, the opinion
of leading technical and legal experts, etc. Such an analysis is outlined in chapter
2 of reference [36] where it is shown that the current practical definition of a
“nuclear explosion” is much narrower that one would intuitively think. In fact,
what is strictly forbidden by the CTBT are not explosions in which any kind of
nuclear reaction would produce some militarily useful explosive yield, but only
explosions in which a diverging fission chain reaction takes place. This is very far
from the idea of a treaty stipulating “not to carry out any nuclear test explosion
or any other nuclear explosion” (Article I of the CTBT) and leaves open the
possibility of designing and testing new types of nuclear weapons in which no
diverging fission chain reaction takes place!
In fact, this research is happening throughout the world, not just in the lab-
oratories of the nuclear weapons states, but also in the major industrial powers
such as Japan and Germany. Using gigantic laser facilities, such the U.S. National
Ignition Facility (NIF), France’s Laser Mégajoule, Japan’s GEKKO at Osaka, and
similar tools in Germany and other countries, enormous progress is being made
towards the design of small fusion bombs in full compliance with the CTBT —
which does not fully restrict the explosive use of nuclear fusion, unlike nuclear
4Similar kinds of “declarations of intent” are used instead of factual evidence to assert that
depleted-uranium weapons are neither incendiary or chemical weapons, despite the pyrophoric
and toxic properties of uranium.
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fission. This activity is now the main advanced weapons research priority of the
nuclear weapons laboratories, which claim that its purpose is just the “stewardship”
of stockpiled nuclear weapons. It is also the main route towards the controlled
release of fusion energy in countries such Japan and Germany, which claim that
these small fusion explosives are only for peaceful applications.
As for defining the term “nuclear weapon,” the main source of difficulties is
that the least unambiguous characteristics of the intuitive concept of a nuclear
weapon are of a qualitative and subjective rather than quantitative and objective
nature. Indeed, it is the enormity of the difference in the destructive power of
nuclear weapons compared to conventional weapons that has historically led to the
qualitative distinction between “nuclear” and “conventional” weapons. Similarly,
it was their indiscriminate nature, and their targeting of cities rather than military
forces, which led to the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” Consequently,
it is now difficult to argue that weapons made of a nuclear material like depleted-
uranium are nuclear weapons, or even that new types of weapons in which a nuclear
explosion takes place that is not forbidden by the CTBT are nuclear weapons.
It appears, therefore, that the most commonly accepted definition of a “nuclear
weapon” — that is of an enormously destructive weapon — has created a situation
in which less potent weapons based on similar materials or physical principles,
and producing similar effects, but on a smaller scale, have become acceptable to
governments as if they were “conventional weapons.”
For example, when the British Under-secretary of state for defence, states that
“Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are indiscriminate wea-
pons of mass destruction specifically designed to incapacitate or kill
large numbers of people. DU ammunition is not” [37]
he is right. However, he is ignoring an important element that lies at the root of
the “dialogue of the deaf” that characterizes the depleted-uranium debate, namely
that depleted-uranium is a nuclear material, that it is radioactive, and that this
has important consequencies — especially in relation to nuclear weapons. It can
therefore be argued that depleted-uranium weapons are not conventional weapons.
Similarly, the fact that the explosive yields of the laboratory-scale fusion
explosions that will be produced in a few years, for example at the U.S. National
Ignition Facility, will correspond to only a few kilogram equivalent of TNT does
not mean that these explosions are not nuclear explosions, which in fact they are
according to both physics and common sense.
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3.3 Depleted-uranium and fourth generation nuclear weapons
As we have just seen, the huge difference in the damage produced by a single
“city-busting” nuclear weapon compared to the impact of conventional weapons
has led to the contemporary situation in which a radioactive material such as
depleted-uranium is routinely used on the battlefield, and in which new types
of nuclear explosives are being designed. These nuclear explosives could have
yields in the range of 1 to 100 ton equivalents of TNT, i.e., in the gap which
today separates conventional weapons from nuclear weapons, which have yields
equivalent to thousands or millions of tons of TNT.
These new types of nuclear explosives are called fourth generation nuclear
weapons (for an extensive discussion and a comprehensive bibliography see ref-
erence [36]). This name refers to a terminology in which the first generation
corresponds to “atomic” or “nuclear” bombs, and the second to “hydrogen” or
“thermonuclear” bombs. The third generation corresponds then to the “tailored”
or “enhanced” effects warheads such as the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW,
also called neutron bomb) which were never deployed in large numbers because
they never found any truly convincing military use. Moreover, since these third
generation weapons still had the high yields and large radioactive fallouts charac-
teristic of the first two generations they could not be used on the battlefield as if
they were some kind of trivial tactical weapons.
In comparison to the previous generations, fourth generation nuclear explosives
are characterized by the following features :
• They will not contain a significant amount of nuclear-weapon-usable mate-
rial (i.e., plutonium or highly enriched uranium) in which a self-sustaining
diverging chain reaction could take place, so that their development and
testing will not be forbidden by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
• They will produce relatively little radioactive fallout and residual radioac-
tivity, because they will contain little or no fissile materials at all;
• They will derive the bulk of their explosive yield from fusion (which is why
they may be qualified as “pure fusion” explosives) rather than from fission or
other nuclear reactions, so that their radioactive effects will be those induced
by fusion;
• They will have relatively low explosive yields, so that they will not qualify
as weapons of mass destruction.
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Consequently, compared to the third generation, fourth generation nuclear
explosives are much more likely to find numerous military applications. In partic-
ular, it is well known that the amount of conventional explosive that is delivered
by precision-guided munitions like cruise missiles (i.e., 50 to 100 kg of chemi-
cal high explosives) is ridiculous in comparison to their cost: some targets can
only be destroyed by the expenditure of numerous delivery systems while a single
one loaded with a more powerful warhead could be sufficient. Therefore, the
availability of fourth generation nuclear warheads with yields in the range of 1 to
100 ton equivalents of TNT will constitute a very dramatic change in warfare, a
change that can only be compared to the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945 or
the first deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1959. Indeed, fourth
generation nuclear weapons will have yields a thousand times larger than con-
ventional weapons, that is a thousand time smaller than nuclear weapons of the
previous generations, which means that they are much more likely to be used on
the battlefield than first, second, or third generations nuclear weapons, especially
since they correspond to a strongly perceived military need.
In practice, while proponents of fourth generation nuclear weapons may con-
vincingly argue that just like depleted-uranium weapons they are not weapons of
mass destruction, that they can be used in discriminate ways, etc., it will be more
difficult for them to dismiss the fact that they nevertheless produce effects that do
not exist with conventional explosives: namely an intense burst of radiation during
the explosion, and some residual radioactivity afterwards.
The proponents will therefore argue that the burst of radiation (mostly high-
energy fusion neutrons) will affect only the target area, and that the only long-term
collateral damage will be the “low” residual radioactivity due to the dispersal of
the unburnt fusion fuel and to a smaller extent to the interaction of the neutrons
with the ground, the air, and the materials close to the point of explosion...
It is at this stage of the critical assessment of the military consequences of
the potential use of fourth generation nuclear weapons that an important finding
was made: The expenditure of many tons of depleted-uranium has a radiological
impact comparable to that of the combat use of many kilotons TNT equivalent of
pure-fusion nuclear explosives [5].
This finding, which is reported in the Proceedings of the Fourth International
Conference of the Yugoslav Nuclear Society, Belgrade, Sep.30 - Oct.4, 2002,
was very surprising at first. This is because it was totally unexpected that the
radiological impact of the battlefield use of depleted-uranium could be compared
to that of the battlefield use of a large number of hypothetical fourth generation
nuclear warheads. But this is what the laws of physics and what is known about the
effects of nuclear radiations on human beings imply: the use of depleted-uranium
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weapons creates a residual radioactive environment that provides a yardstick which
can be used by the proponents of fourth generation nuclear weapons to demonstrate
that the radioactive burden due to their use is “acceptable.”
For instance, it is found in reference [5] that the expenditure of one ton of
depleted-uranium in the form of bullets has a long-term radiological impact equiv-
alent to the use of many kilotons of hypothetical pure-fusion weapons. This means
that between 100 and 1000 precision-guided munitions (which today deliver only
10 to 100 kilograms of high-explosives), each carrying a pure-fusion warhead with
a yield of 1 to 10 tons of high-explosive equivalent, could be used to produce a
similar radiological impact. Since about 400 tons of depleted-uranium were used
in Iraq, and about 40 in Yugoslavia, the radiological impact in these countries
corresponds to that of using tenths of thousands of precision-guided munitions
tipped with fourth generation nuclear warheads, i.e., many more precision-guided
delivery systems than were actually used in these countries.
Thus, while depleted-uranium weapons create a low radioactive environment,
this radioactive burden is not less negligible than the predictable radiological
impact of the new types of nuclear weapons that are under development. The
battlefield use of depleted-uranium has therefore created a military and legal
precedent for the use of nuclear weapons which produce a radioactive burden that
is much less than that of existing types of nuclear weapons, but which have a
destructive power about a thousand times larger than conventional explosives.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper two important new contributions have been made to the depleted-
uranium debate: (1) a critical appraisal of the conventional weapon’s use of
heavy materials showing that depleted-uranium alloys have no truly significant
technical or military advantage over tungsten alloys for that purpose; and (2) an
analysis showing that depleted-uranium weapons cannot be classed as conventional
weapons and that they belong to the diffuse category of low-radiological-impact
nuclear weapons to which emerging types of nuclear explosives also belong.
These contributions serve to complete and reinforce the numerous arguments
that have been put forward to show that depleted-uranium weapons are illegal
according to international law and contrary to the rules of war. They also clarify
the discussion of the reasons why depleted-uranium weapons have been made and
why they were used in Iraq and Yugoslavia.
Since the main battlefield use of depleted-uranium was in anti-tank weapons,
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let us review and critique six of the more obvious military reasons that must have
played a role in deciding to use them against Iraqi and Serbian armor:
1. The most effective ammunition available had to be used in order to get
quick results. Depleted-uranium munitions are at best only marginally more
effective than tungsten munitions. Moreover, the majority of Iraqi tanks
were not of the latest Soviet generation (such as the T-80), and the use of
depleted-uranium rounds in Yugoslavia against lightly armored tanks and
personnel carriers was a gross overkill. In fact, just as effective (and less
costly) non-radioactive anti-tank weapons were available in large numbers
during both the Iraqi and Yugoslavia campaigns.
2. Depleted-uranium munitions have the additional advantage that uranium
is pyrophoric. The incendiary effect of depleted-uranium anti-tank rounds
is only a marginal contribution to their tank lethality effect. On the other
hand, the pyrophoric property of uranium is the main short-term cause of
the dispersion of uranium in the environment.
3. Depleted-uranium munitions were available but had never been tested on
the battlefield. Their use in 1991 broke a 46-year-long taboo against the
intentional battlefield use of radioactive materials. It is therefore particularly
shocking that during the Gulf War the British Ministry of Defence quickly
adapted depleted-uranium ammunition developed for the new Challenger-2
tank so as to use it on the existing Challenger-1 tank fleet [35]. This meant
that the munition could be labeled “combat proven” after the war.
4. Depleted-uranium is a radioactive material which inspires pride in its users,
fear in its victims, and strong reactions in the bystanders. Indeed, depleted-
uranium long-rod penetrators are the “favorite rounds” of tank gunners and
the “least acceptable rounds” to a large share of the public opinion and
environmental activists. Consequently, the numerous and often excessive
reactions of the anti-depleted-uranium activists unwillingly contributed to
the military propaganda machine by amplifying the military-psychological
advantage of using depleted-uranium instead of a non-radioactive material.
5. Depleted-uranium weapons have an overall long-term radiological effect
comparable to that of pure-fusion nuclear weapons. Like the previous rea-
son, there is no direct evidence that this reason was taken into account at
some stage of the decision making process. However, the analysis made in
reference [5], as well as considerable indirect evidence,5 show that the mili-
5For example, the care that is taken in all published documents to avoid any open discussion
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tary planners6 are acutely aware of the full consequences of using depleted-
uranium and the lessons that can be learned from its use. In particular, it is
indisputable that the use of a radioactive material in Iraq and Yugoslavia has
created a military and legal precedent. Similarly, it is indisputable that this
use has provided a first test of the acceptability of future weapons that would
produce a low level of radioactivity. In fact, the use of depleted-uranium
weapons has proved to be acceptable, both from a military point of view
because the induced radioactivity did not impair further military action, and
from a political standpoint because most political leaders, and shapers of
public opinion, did not object to their battlefield use.
6. Depleted-uranium weapons are less expensive than tungsten weapons. This
reason has been left for the end because it is not strictly-speaking a military
reason and because it is fallacious in two respects. First, it is clear that the
cost of a single anti-tank round that is capable of destroying,or saving, a main
battle tank is marginal in comparison to the cost of such a tank. Therefore,
using a phrase that is much used in such a context, if “gold plating” would
improve the performance of anti-tank rounds, they would all be gold plated!
Consequently, it can be asserted that even if depleted-uranium was more
expensive than tungsten and depleted-uranium rounds were only marginally
better than tungsten rounds, uranium rounds would still be preferred by the
military. Second, it turns out that the market value of depleted uranium
is artificially low because it is a surplus of the nuclear industry. However,
this low price of the raw material proves to be misleading: the additional
costs incurred by choosing uranium (processing difficulties, problems due to
pyrophorism and radioactivity, clean-up of the environment after use, etc.)
mean that the full life-cycle cost of uranium is much higher than that of
tungsten [38]. Therefore, if the full life-cycle cost is taken into account, the
preference easily goes to tungsten, an observation that the tungsten industry
has not failed to make [39]. To sum up, in a situation such as the 1991 Gulf
War where a full range of antitank weapons was available — including a
number of tungsten antitank weapons, which it would have been opportune
to compare in combat to uranium ones — the price argument was truly of
secondary importance.
of the long-term radiological impact of pure-fusion nuclear weapons: see, e.g., reference 6 cited
in [5]. In fact this impact is very simple to calculate, and immediately suggests a comparison with
low-radioactive contamination such as arising from the combat use of depleted-uranium [5].
6Here, “military planners” refers not so much to the high-ranking soliders who planned the
operations in Iraq or Yugoslavia (or those who previously approved the introduction of depleted-
uranium weapons into arsenals) but rather to the analysts in defense departments and laboratories,
as well as in military think-tanks and universities, who shape general policies according to both
technical and political considerations, either by direct input to the decision makers, or by omission.
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Reflecting on these military reasons, one sees that they basically take the same
line of argument that is always developed in order to justify the introduction of
some new controversial weapon. In the case at hand, there are even strong echos
of the “neutron bomb debate” of the mid 1980s [10, 11, 12]. In that debate, the
proponents presented the neutron bomb as a kind of almost magical superweapon
that would defeat a Soviet tank invasion without producing large collateral dam-
age to the surrounding towns and cities. The argument was shown to be plain
wrong by simply making an analysis of modern tank armor technology and by
calculating the protection that would be provided by such armor against the neu-
trons from a neutron bomb [11]. Similar analyses were made in section 2 of
this paper (where a rather long argument was required to complete the proof that
depleted-uranium rounds are no “silver bullets”) and in reference [5], using only
published professional papers, and purely scientific arguments. The conclusions
are that depleted-uranium weapons are not superweapons of any kind, and that
their perceived military advantages, as well as their perceived environmental dis-
advantages, are vastly exaggerated by both the proponents and the opponents of
these weapons.
In the case of the neutron bomb debate, it turned out that rational and measured
arguments of the kind put forward in references [10, 11, 12] had a remarkable im-
pact on the outcome of the debate, which turned to the advantage of the opponents.
It is therefore of interest to see what such arguments can say about the possible
reasons why depleted uranium weapons have been put into arsenals despite the
numerous environmental, medical, technical, legal, and political objections that
have been anticipated, and are still raised against their fabrication, deployment,
and use.
First of all, as can be seen in the professional literature, of which the bibliog-
raphy of this paper only gives a limited overview, there has been a lively debate
between ballistic weaponeers about the merits and demerits of depleted-uranium
versus tungsten projectiles. This debate has been running for fifty years now, and
the use of depleted-uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia has only reinforced the convic-
tions of the weaponeers opposed to depleted-uranium. In fact, while the U.S. Navy
had already reverted to tungsten years before the Gulf War, and the U.S. Air Force
has now decided that its next generation tank killer will not use depleted-uranium
[40], no country that had decided against depleted-uranium penetrators changed
its policy after 1991.7
Secondly, there are the well-known facts that the price of depleted uranium
7The main reason given by these countries has always been that it is contradictory to impose
almost zero-level release of radioactivity to the environment by the nuclear industry, while at the
same time to accept its uncontrolled release by the military.
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has been made artificially low in order to encourage its use [1], and that the price
of tungsten (like that of other strategic materials) is mainly a function of political
decisions such as the level of releases from the huge stockpiles maintained in
Russia and the United States [39]. Moreover, there is the observation that the
unclassified American technical literature is clearly biased in that it mostly refers
to the performance of anti-tank penetrators rather than to the performance of
complete anti-tank weapon systems (see also [7]). All of this suggests that the
push towards the use of depleted-uranium has been much stronger than was ever
justified by a small perceived advantage of uranium alloys over tungsten alloys in
one specific application: long-rod penetration into homogeneous armor.
Thirdly, there is a long history of events showing that the “nuclear lobby”
(which in the 1950s and 60s was the incarnation of “progress and modernity”)
has always had a very strong influence on the course of economic and military
affairs in all the nuclear powers. In particular, one can see its influence in the
politics behind the development of new nuclear weapons, for example the neutron
bomb, or new sources of nuclear energy, for example micro-explosion fusion. It is
tempting to speculate that a policy which consists of making the price of a material
like depleted-uranium as low as possible is both an investment into the future and
a way to trivialize the use of radioactive materials in all circumstances.
Finally, there is the very grave military and legal precedent created by the
combat use of a radioactive material, which is a clear violation of the spirit, if not
the letter, of a norm that was in force since 1945. To argue that nobody holding
a position of competence or responsibility was aware of the full consequences of
breaking this norm would be quite unreasonable. On the contrary, considering
the existence of a lively internal debate on the consequencies of the battlefield use
of depleted-uranium and other nuclear materials, it is certain that these had been
thoroughly investigated long before the 1991. One must admit, therefore, that the
choice made in favor of using depleted-uranium took into account the fact that its
battlefield use would trivialize the military use of radioactive materials, and would
therefore make the use of nuclear weapons more probable.
In conclusion, it can be argued that besides its military function, the use of
depleted-uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia must have served a political purpose:
to prepare for the progressive introduction of fourth generation nuclear weapons
whose battlefield use will cause a low (but non-negligible) residual radioactive
environment. It may even be possible to argue that depleted-uranium was used in
Iraq — and then in Yugoslavia where there was little military reasons for using it
— in order to test the opposition of the Western public opinion to the induction of
radioactivity on the battlefield, and to get the world population accustomed to the
combat use of depleted-uranium and fourth-generation nuclear weapons.
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